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Abstract 
Early Buddhist discourse recognizes the problem of dukkha (suffering) and argues 
that the cause of dukkha can be removed. This paper attempts to demonstrate how 
Buddhist claim that dukkha can be removed fails as it creates epistemological 
complications within the Buddhist discourse, and attempts to show how substituting 
Heidegger’s concept of Angst for Buddhist concept of dukkha could solve this problem. 
It is argued that the solution proposed by the four noble truths of early Buddhist 
tradition contradicts with the ontological and epistemological properties and 
implications of the concept of dukkha, and, accordingly, these properties of dukkha 
ought to be revised. As a solution to this problem, it is proposed that Angst addresses 
the problem of suffering more efficiently by not engendering such epistemological 
Artículos atravesados por (o cuestionando) la idea del sujeto -y su género- como una construcción psicobiológica de la cultura. 
Articles driven by (or questioning) the idea of the subject -and their gender- as a cultural psychobiological construction 
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complications while also retaining the philosophy and worldview created by the 
Buddhist discourse as it accurately facilitates the Buddhist perspective. 
 
Resumen 
El discurso budista de los primeros tiempos reconoce el problema del dukkha 
(sufrimiento) y sostiene que su causa se puede eliminar. Este artículo intenta 
demostrar cómo la afirmación budista de que se puede eliminar el dukkha no cierra, 
ya que genera complicaciones epistemológicas dentro del discurso budista e intenta 
demostrar que sustituir el concepto budista de dukkha por el concepto de Angst de 
Heidegger podría resolver este problema. Se argumenta que la solución propuesta por 
las cuatro verdades nobles de la tradición budista de los primeros tiempos contradice 
las propiedades e implicaciones ontológicas y epistemológicas del concepto de 
dukkha, y, en consecuencia, estas propiedades de dukkha se deberían revisar. Como 
solución, se propone que Angst aborda el problema del sufrimiento de manera más 
eficiente al no generar tales complicaciones epistemológicas al tiempo que conserva 
la filosofía y la cosmovisión del discurso budista ya que facilita con precisión la 
perspectiva budista. 
 
Keywords: problem of suffering; four noble truths; Buddhism; early Buddhism; dukkha; 
Heidegger; angst; anguish 
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Introduction 
While Buddhist discourse seemingly does not foster a problem 
concerning the existence of evil, it is imperative to show how early 
Buddhist tradition ontologically contradicts with its premises in its 
attempt to evaluate the existence of suffering to accurately examine the 
approach taken by this discourse. Accordingly, in this paper I will pursue 
to demonstrate how early Buddhist philosophy fails to maintain 
consistent ontological and metaphysical frameworks as it perceives 
beings in terms of finitude (Umehara, 1970) yet does not evidently 
acknowledge the continuity of spatial, temporal, and casual nature of 
things, which are required for us to claim that a thing is empirically real 
(Abelsen, 1993). 
Thus, I will first dissect the Buddhist approach to existence of beings 
and to the four noble truths and show how these two approaches might 
engender a logical problem through Schopenhauer’s fourfold law of 
sufficient reason.  
Then, I will wear a Western perspective to argue that while Buddhist 
view on existence seems rational, its approach to evil and suffering has 
essential epistemological complications.  
In the conclusion, I will suggest that the implementation of Heidegger’s 
account of suffering, which ultimately originates from a similar 
metaphysical and epistemological understanding of world to that of 
Buddhist tradition, to the Buddhist discourse of existence provides the 
discourse with further consistency which Buddhist account of suffering 
fails to capture. 
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The four noble truths are as follows: 
(1) Suffering exists 
(2) Suffering has a cause 
(3) The cause can be removed 
(4) There are eight practices by which the cause of suffering can be 
removed (Umehara, 1970) 
 
Now, prima facie, Buddhism acknowledges that suffering exists. 
Furthermore, it also acknowledges that its existence follows a cause, as 
(2) states. Indeed, (2) is contingent to Buddhist perception of this world 
that every phenomena is conditioned by causes (Kalupahana, 1977). This 
account creates an empirical basis for a metaphysical explanation of this 
world which ultimately stems from impermanency and which accordingly 
rejects substantial forms.  
However, this does not eo ipso mean that since all phenomena are 
impermanent all phenomena therefore are or imply dukkha –suffering, 
unrest–. While all phenomena are nonsubstantial since they are casually 
determined, not all phenomena are dispositionally determined, and only 
those that are dispositionally determined are dukkha (Kalupahana, 
1977). Thus, although world is necessarily impermanent, the suffering 
can be avoided as not everything is dispositionally determined (Gäb, 
2015). 
 
Problem with the Solution for Suffering in Early Buddhism 
The discourse of phenomena and how they are determined, I believe, 
can be analyzed in the context of Schopenhauer’s fourfold law of 
sufficient reason (Schopenhauer, 2012). Indeed, I would like to argue that 
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we start to recognize similar traces of metaphysics, ontology, and 
epistemology in Schopenhauer’s principle as we begin to further analyze 
how the existence persists in spatiotemporal universe in Buddhism.  
In early Buddhist tradition, the world is devoid of substance, exists 
only in terms of emptiness as all phenomena is essentially finite and 
ephemeral (Abelsen, 1993). While the accession of (3) presupposes a 
conscious will, finitude extends beyond humans to all beings 
(Stambaugh, 1970). This argument presumes a kind of causality that 
fourfold law of sufficient reason asserts. It necessitates beings, 
consciousness, and actions in spatiotemporal dimension to ensue on a 
preceding being, consciousness, or an action that existed in the same 
spatiotemporal dimension. Accordingly, while Buddhism seems to reject 
ontology of beings as defined in Western tradition, it ultimately permits 
ontological assay of beings. Furthermore, the propositions of four noble 
truths do not demonstrate the intrinsic quality of truths themselves, but 
the sacredness they engender displays the quality Buddha has given to 
them (Orrù & Wang, 1992). That is, while four noble truths imply the 
value they are bestowed, they lack the capacity to capture the essence of 
the essence of themselves.  
To these ends, Buddhism’s four noble truths self contradict in that 
while the Buddhist argument originates from the claim that a being or a 
thought necessarily precedes a being or a thought as all beings are 
impermanent themselves, it also argues for the possibility of cessation of 
the cause of suffering. This worldview is then conflicting since while the 
views of impermanency and (3) are valid per se, they are inconsistent with 
each other. That is, if the ephemerality of beings prove the causality that 
the principle of sufficient reason argues for holds true, then the cause of 
suffering cannot be removed for two reasons.  
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First, the existence of things must follow a line if the impermanency 
makes up for the future existence of things. The finitude in Buddhist 
tradition, while it exemplifies for the end of things, also implies the 
beginning of other things, which ultimately are finite. Therefore, as the 
exact infinitude is absent in being, then the being itself is the reason for 
the derivations of such and such being. Accordingly, the cause of the 
suffering cannot be removed fully as the notion of removal must follow a 
notion that causes the suffering: A notion that pursues to dismiss the 
cause of the suffering requires the cause of the suffering, yet as this 
notion is impermanent, it cannot engender itself as itself would require 
the cause of suffering. Thus, even if the cause of the suffering can be 
removed, this removal can also only be ephemeral as the notion of 
removing the cause of suffering implies not the continuance of itself, but 
continuance of the cause of suffering.  
Second reason is that the dispositionally determined phenomena are 
dukkha. While disposition, as argued in the first reason, follows another 
disposition, dispositionally determined action to remove the cause of 
dukkha itself is dukkha. While casual actions do not necessarily imply 
dukkha, dispositional actions, even if they are imposed to remove the 
dukkha, are essentially dukkha. That is, just as suffering is a result of 
our craving (Gäb, 2015), a will that is dispositional towards this craving 
would also result in suffering as it essentially is craving itself. Thus, if (3) 
is realized by a dispositional notion, which is fundamentally very likely, 
then (3) paradoxically engenders (1). 
 
Using Heidegger’s Angst to Solve the Problem 
Since the metaphysical and epistemological prescription of the world 
of Buddhist tradition is very similar to that of Heidegger, I would like to 
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propose changing Buddhist account of dukkha to Heidegger’s account of 
Angst (Heidegger, 1962) as I believe the concept of Angst provides more 
consistency to Buddhist discourse than dukkha does. However, I want to 
respond to some possible counterarguments to my proposition before 
discussing why it appears as a rational idea to implement Angst into 
Buddhist philosophy how it could be accomplished. 
(1) While some might argue that substituting dukkha with Angst would 
alter the four noble truths, as dukkha is essential to the Worldview 
Buddhism adheres to, I kindly reject this proposition. Even though the 
concept of dukkha per se and how it is perceived are essential to Buddhist 
philosophy, I believe that Buddhist tradition would more efficiently 
employ Angst because of the inconsistency of dukkha’s eschatological 
aspect with the general framework Buddhism I have shown above. To this 
end, Angst would not engender the epistemological problems we examine 
in Buddhist discourse that are caused by the conception of dukkha. 
(2) Another point of view that attempts to undermine my proposition is 
that the concern of finitude extend beyond humans in Buddhism 
(Stambaugh, 1970) while Heidegger’s ontology mainly discusses being 
and be-ing as a human. Stambaugh argues that Heidegger’s Angst “is a 
fundamental state of mind of Dasein” and has a revealing character in 
that it “reveals to Dasein the world as world in all its uncanniness.” 
(Stambaugh, 1970).  
I think Stambaugh’s argument is weak in that while Heidegger does 
indeed not pursue a holistic question of being, he does not deny that 
beings other than humans are essentially finite, and that while Angst has 
a revealing character, such character is not intrinsic but descriptive. 
Heidegger’s choice of not engaging in the discourse that extends beyond 
humans can perhaps most aptly be explained by Geworfenheit –
thrownness–. Unlike the Buddhist tradition which argues that dukkha 
Implementation of Heidegger’s Angst into Buddhist Problem of Suffering                                           Ege Kaan Duman 
 
 
Revista Científica Arbitrada de la Fundación MenteClara     Vol. 4 (2) 2019, ISSN 2469-0783 14 
ceases with nirvana, Heidegger argues that suffering does not cease, but 
is metamorphisized into Angst with Dasein’s confronting the finitude of 
his/her being and be-ing. Accordingly, the avoidance of complete 
eternality –sasvata– and nothingness –ucheda– Buddhism argues for 
demonstrates itself more efficiently in Heidegger’s Angst as it 
presupposes a dispositional consciousness.  
Then, Angst does not directly reveal the world and its uncanniness to 
Dasein, but when Das Man becomes Dasein, he/she becomes aware of 
the world Angst implies. Ergo, while Heidegger’s concern for finitude does 
not extend beyond humans like Buddhist concern, the finitude per se 
does. The reason it is not discussed in Heidegger’s ontology as clearly as 
in Buddhist discourse is that the Geworfenheit can only be a constant 
medium for Dasein, which, ultimately, is human. 
(3) Last counterargument is that the deconstruction I apply to Buddhist 
philosophy and Heidegger’s ontology is simply too much that recombining 
certain parts of each scheme would mean that the system I create would 
not be employed by Buddhist tradition. That is, if I subtract dukkha and 
melt Angst in Buddhism, it would neither be Buddhism nor Heidegger’s 
ontology. This argument resembles (1) but is different from (1) in that it 
threatens the entire integrity of Buddhist tradition while (1) mainly 
concerns four noble truths. I would like to disagree with this supposition. 
The reason I believe that deconstruction of both philosophies does not eo 
ipso jeopardize the integrity of these philosophies is that they both can 
only function in the spatiotemporal domain. Therefore, Heidegger’s 
ontology, which insists that be-ing is not situated in time per se, but that 
Zeitigung “(temporalization) of time, [...] is precisely” the “understanding of 
being”, (Levinas & Committee of Public, 1996) and early Buddhist 
discourse which constructs its ontological philosophy on the finitude of 
beings share a common rhizome. For this reason, I believe that 
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deconstruction and reassessment of these philosophies would not pose 
threat to their consistency and integrity. 
Now that I gave my responses to some possible objections to replacing 
dukkha with Angst, I want to discuss why and how we can perform this 
replacement. I have two major motivations to do so. (1) As I have 
explained earlier in this paper, my first reason is the inconsistency of the 
impermanency with the principle of sufficient reason the concept of 
dukkha engenders. (2) My second reason is that Angst resolves this 
inconsistency.  
In order to implement Angst into Buddhist discourse, we ought not to 
limit the question of suffering to Angst. While suffering exists in other 
forms, Angst ought to be discussed only as a transcendental consequence 
of Zeitgung. Heidegger claimed that every understanding originates from 
an affective disposition, and that our being is essentially understanding 
of being, our way of self-Zeitgung (Levinas & Committee of Public, 1996). 
Since understanding of self is manifested through disposition, then being 
also is manifested through disposition. With hypothetical syllogism, since 
understanding of self through Zeitgung is being, and since it is 
determined dispositionally, understanding of self is a cause of suffering. 
Therefore, according to Buddhism, this perspective necessitates a 
suffering that is finite, yet is unending in that it intermittently recreates 
itself in similar topologies. Applying Angst solves our problem because it 
permeates the understanding of self. By that, I do not mean that it rips 
the spatiotemporal membrane that we stand on, but it evaporates the 
rigidity of temporality while also being engendered by the same 
temporalization. Angst reminds Dasein that life is finite and Geworfenheit 
is real that it helps us maintain the boundaries of ontology within the 
boundaries of this finitude. Accordingly, if the self understands the true 
nature of existence, while dukkha pathologizes the causality of beings by 
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arguing that finitude can be undermined by removing the cause of 
dukkha, Angst diagnoses dukkha by, in the starkest terms, showing that 
suffering does not end but only change its form. As the core idea of 
finitude is retained and paradox is solved through the substitution of 
dukkha by Angst, I believe it provides an efficient account in creating a 
worldview which is consistent with itself while dealing with the problem 
of suffering by not ignoring the principle of sufficient reason Buddhism 
adopts. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have attempted to demonstrate how the term dukkha 
might pose a contradiction to early Buddhist discourse and proposed that 
utilizing Heidegger’s term Angst instead would help us sustain better 
hermeneutics for Buddhist perspective. I first showed that early Buddhist 
tradition was established on the basis of principle of sufficient reason as 
it presumed that beings were finite and continuity of existence 
necessitated a linear spatiotemporal model. Then I argued that dukkha 
unintentionally collapses this scheme as it undermines the causality of 
this continuity. After this, I discussed how Heidegger’s Angst would 
facilitate Buddhist perspective better as it does not undermine the 
causality it is built upon, and responded to some possible objections on 
why Heidegger’s ontology is not compatible with early Buddhism. In my 
conclusion, I found that Angst would not pose the same threats dukkha 
does to core Buddhist principles and would be established on a more 
consistent basis, and, accordingly, ought to be utilized in Buddhist 
discourse in place of dukkha. 
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